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Abstract. Three premises set the stage for a Peirce based notion of resemblance, 
which, as Firstness, cannot be more than vaguely distinguished from Secondness 
and Thirdness. Inclusion of Firstness with, and within, Secondness and Thirdness, 
calls for a nonbivalent, nonlinear, context dependent mode of thinking 
characteristic of semiosis — that is, the process by which everything is always 
becoming something other than what it was becoming — and at the same time it 
includes linear, bivalent classical logic as a subset. Certain aspects of the Dao, 
Buddhist philosophy, and Donald Davidson’s ‘radical interpretation’ afford 
additional, and perhaps unexpected, support for the initial set of three premises. 
 
 
1. Paradigm and syntagm 
 
Premise 1: Resemblance involves what we feel, sense, experience, 
recognize, and acknowledge in something that entails the possibility 
for its interacting with something else. 
 
I begin with a few words on Roman Jakobson, and then I go on to 
suggest some limitations inherent in the ‘structuralist’ framework. 
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According to Jakobson, a sentence is formed by selecting words and 
combining them in terms of paradigmatic association and linear 
syntagmatic arrangement. ‘He’ or ‘They’, and ‘spoke’ or ‘listened’, 
enjoy paradigmatic association. ‘He spoke’ and ‘They listened’ are 
organized syntagmatically. We have in our heads, so the story goes, a 
set of paradigmatic associations from which we choose particular 
lexical items, and we put the product of our choice together in 
syntagmatic strings according to syntactic rules (Jakobson 1971, see 
also Saussure 1966). Thus the set of possible interactions in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.  Bivalent interrelations. 
 
                                 A                                       B 
1 Day Night  
 
Paradigm 
2 White Black 
3 Knowledge Ignorance 
4 Good Evil 
           Syntagm 
 
 
Using these paradigm/syntagm combinations in the order of Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’s (1963) ‘homologies’, we can infer from the terms in 
Table 1 that: Day : Night :: White : Black :: Knowledge : Ignorance :: 
Good : Evil. Alternately, with respect to metaphorical/ metonymical 
relations, we could have ‘King’ as the powerful force within the 
‘Empire’ linked through metonymical relations, and ‘Lion’ and ‘Jungle’ 
linked to ‘King’ and ‘Empire’ through metaphorical-metonymical 
relations, and we have another Lévi-Strauss homology: King : Lion :: 
Empire : Jungle. There is metaphorical resemblance between King and 
Lion and Empire and Jungle on the basis of metonymical relations 
between King and Empire and Lion and Jungle. 
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There is also a problem, as sinologist A. C. Graham (1992: 59–83) 
points out, given the inclination in the West to take paradigmatic 
terms as if they were nothing more than binary oppositions. 
According to binarism, Day and Night, White and Black, Knowledge 
and Ignorance, and Good and Evil, are pairs of terms in conflict. Since 
each term is what it is, and immutably so in an ideal world, any choice 
between the individual terms in a pair must be either between the one 
or the other, for, binarily speaking, there can be no possible ‘third 
term’. Thus the classical bivalent, logical Principles of Identity, Non-
Contradiction and Excluded-Middle.1 
However, such chains of opposition have been up for question 
during roughly a half century, especially after Jacques Derrida (1976) 
notoriously argued that Western pairs of terms in conflict, given our 
‘logocentric’ bias, prioritize one end of an opposition over the other: 
signified over signifier, reality over appearance, culture over nature, 
men over women, whites over others, good over evil, knowledge over 
ignorance, and so on, as if the prioritized terms had no intrinsic need 
of their counterparts. 
This often presupposes that the signified can make its own way 
among other signifieds, as if it were autonomous of its respective 
signifier; that reality is objective, and has no need of subjective 
appearances; that culture is autonomous of, and need not feed from, 
nature; that people of ‘color’ are no more than a burden for ‘whites’; 
that if we could all know the good precisely for what it is, evil would be 
no more; that women are necessary for procreation and certain 
marital duties, but other than that it’s a man’s world; that if we could 
just reason infallibly, all our irreason would dissolve and all our 
problems would eventually be solved; and other such biased and 
absurd propositions. 
                                                 
1  In a nutshell, these Principles can be articulated as:  Identity (A = A), Non-
Contradiction (not both A and Not-A), and Excluded-Middle (either A or Not-A; 
that is, either A or some alternative). 
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This notion of linear, bivalent chains of opposition governed by 
paradigms, if extrapolated to the extreme, could be construed as entire 
world images, or scientific theories as it were, that are incommen-
surable, incomparable, and virtually untranslatable, with virtually no 
lines of resemblance between them, for they are as alien to one another 
as apples and aardvarks. This is, of course, the holistic ‘incommen-
surability thesis’ that became the rage following Thomas Kuhn’s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). As the incommensurabilist 
story goes, Newtonian physics, based on Euclidean geometry and 
separation of space and time, is a far cry, and well-nigh inconceivable, 
from within the frame of reference of Einsteinian physics, which is 
predicated on Riemannian geometry and timespace union. Thus the 
meaning of terms the likes of ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘momentum’, ‘energy’, 
and ‘matter’, bear no translatability or comparability, much less 
similarity or resemblance, from exclusively within the Newtonian and 
the Einsteinian perspectives respectively (see also Feyerabend 1975). 
However, as this essay unfolds, we shall note that everything is 
‘multivalently’ and ‘nonlinearly’ interdependently interrelated to, and 
interactive with, everything else, which is to say that nothing is abso-
lutely incommensurable or incompatible with anything else, but rather, 
complementarity is the watchword.2 And with complementarity in 
mind, mediation comes into the picture by means of which there is 
always the possibility of something else, some ‘third sign’, that might 
emerge from between the two poles of a bivalent pair of conflicting 
signs. 
 
                                                 
2  I use the italicized terms “interdependent”, “interactive”, and “interrelated”, 
though they are not exactly Peircean in origin.  Nevertheless, as I have argued in 
detail elsewhere, citing derivation of these terms in Buddhist philosophy and 
quantum theory, I believe they effectively portray the spirit of Peirce regarding his 
general concept of semiosis (for further in this regard, see merrell 2000, 2002, 
2003, 2010). 
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Table 2. Complementary interrelations. 
 
                                Yin                                  Yang 
1 Night Day  
 
‘Paradigm’ 
2 Darkness Light 
3 Knowledge Ignorance 
4 Female Male 
         ‘Syntagm’ 
 
 
2. Complementarity 
 
Premise 2: Resemblance emerges out of something that is interdepen-
dently, interrelatedly interactive with something else when some sense 
of that something else is included within the something, and vice versa. 
 
The Dao, Buddhism, and certain other strains of Asian philosophy, as 
well as some branches of Western thought, namely, process philo-
sophy as characterized mainly by Charles S. Peirce, William James, 
John Dewey, and Alfred North Whitehead, take their leave of bivalent 
thinking. 
Non-bivalent processual thinking entails that, first, what there is, is 
always becoming something other than what it was becoming; hence it 
enjoys no relatively fixed Identity Principle stipulating that what is, is 
what it is, yesterday, today and into the receding future. Second, there 
is no need to shrink in horror when Contradictions pop up; in fact, 
thinking can continue to flow along within the process of becoming in 
spite of apparent Contradictions, which are often a boon rather than a 
bane for creating new ideas; hence the Principle of Non-Contradiction 
doesn’t always hold. Third, available options, alternatives, or ‘third 
signs’, do not simply involve a set of two way streets such that you’re 
either coming or going, either right or wrong, either one of ‘us’ or one 
of ‘them’; in other words, any fork in the road is more than merely 
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bivalent (an either/or affair); it is tri-, and multivalent; that is to say, 
the intransigent Excluded-Middle Principle loses its iron-clad grip. 
In sum, Identity is a fluid transient affair; both horns of a 
Contradiction often can and advisably should be entertained, for they 
might lead to keener insight on a problem situation; and rather than 
the sacrosanct Excluded-Middle Principle, Included-Middles (‘third 
signs’) should often be embraced in order to allow the emergence of 
something new out of conflicting concepts, for otherwise, an un-
wanted stalemate would likely ensue (in general, see Peirce CP 6.164–
184, 6.185–238, 6.318–394, also Odin 1996; Priest 2004). 
In this light, consider Table 2. Notice that the familiar pair of Dao 
terms has entered the equation: Yin-Yang. Notice also that these terms 
are not merely incompatible, for within the one there is a little bit of 
the other, and vice versa (as in ). I will henceforth label this 
mingling of the one within the other the ‘area of possible (convergent, 
coalescent) resemblance’. In other words, Yin and Yang are comple-
mentary.3 This is to say that there can be no Yin without Yang and no 
Yang without Yin (see also Kothari 1985; Mansfield 1989). 
                                                 
3  I should very briefly qualify the meaning of complementarity as the word is 
used in this essay. I would like to think that, as physicist Niels Bohr (1934: 39) put 
it, we are not dealing with contradictory but complementary images and ideas, and 
complementarity ‘is a term suited to embrace the features of individuality [within a 
local context] of quantum phenomena [within the global context]’.  Physicist John 
Bell (1989: 363) tells us that Bohr doesn’t use ‘complementary’ in the customary 
sense according to which an elephant, from the front is ‘head, trunk, and two legs’, 
from the back is ‘bottom, tail, and two legs’, and from the sides is ‘otherwise’ and 
from top and bottom ‘different again’. These views ‘supplement one another, and 
they are all entailed by the unifying concept “elephant”’.  Bohr, in contrast, makes 
a distinction between the object as seen from local and relatively limited per-
spectives and the object as seen from an encompassing view. Bohr’s comple-
mentarity, then, has to do with interrelations between a global view, on the one 
hand, and diverse local views, on the other (Havas 1993). For example, the 
‘rabbit/duck’ drawing, made notorious by Wittgenstein, is either a ‘rabbit’ or a 
‘duck’ from two distinct and mutually exclusive local views, but from the global 
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This is to say that within Yin-Yang, there is no either/or categorical 
distinction between light and day, black and white, good and evil, 
knowledge and ignorance, male and female, and so on. It’s the vague-
ness of Yin-Yang’s mutually interpenetrating and merging form; it’s 
the inbetweenness, which gives rise to the emergence of something 
spontaneous, different, new. Thus, here also, there is no fixed Identity, 
no categorical Contradiction barring, and no immovable Excluded-
Middle. Rather, depending on the way of taking them, there is either 
both Yin and Yang — in which case we have a continuum without any 
mutilating cuts between them — or there is neither exclusively Yin nor 
Yang — in which case they are contradictorily complementarily con-
verging and coalescing in order to create something new and keep the 
process alive (Hall, Ames 2001; Gangadean 1981; Loy 1988; also 
merrell 2007, 2009). 
In other words, Yin and Yang are by no means crisp, clear and 
distinct forms or terms: they are by their very nature vague, a 
vagueness that endows them with their fountainhead of creativity. And 
as catch-all terms or forms in the order of generalities of the most 
general sort, they are nonetheless not exempt from some tinge of 
ambiguity or vagueness, which renders them plastic, pliable, poly-
morphous, processual. This interplay of vagueness and generality, I 
must hasten to add, is Peircean through and through (CP 5.438–63; 
Chiasson 2002; Engel-Tiercelin 1992; merrell 1997, 2007; Nadin 1983; 
Putnam 1983). 
Moreover, in somewhat a Peircean sense, the residue of Yang 
within Yin and Yin within Yang can allow for comparability between 
them, and by implication, among any and all objects, acts, and 
happenings — signs all! Likewise, there is some area of similarity and 
resemblance between anything and anything else — everything is 
                                                                                                    
view it is ‘rabbit-duck’; that is, it is both rabbit and duck and it is neither rabbit nor 
duck, according to the way of the image’s taking (for further see Murdoch 1987; 
Plotnitsky 1994). 
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similar to everything else in some respect (CP 5.288–289, see also 
Goodman 1976). In other words, in our less-than-perfect world, and 
given our human fallibility, there is no darkness so total that there are 
nary a few photons of light hanging around, no knowledge so 
complete that it will stand for all time, no logic so iron-clad that it can 
avoid any and all inconsistencies, no good so absolute that there can 
be no evil, no creative endeavor so universally accepted that it will 
suffer no possible criticism, no male absolutely free of any tinge of 
‘femaleness’ in his genes. 
As we shall note in more detail below, all generalities have some 
degree of vagueness included within them, and all vagueness, to be 
effectively conceptualized, even to the most minimal degree, evinces, 
from within, some promise of generality. 
 
 
3. Bivalence is not enough 
 
Premise 3: Resemblance entails more than merely something that 
bears similarity with something else; there must be a mediating 
function, a ‘third’, capable of bringing them together in the same way 
it brings itself together with them. 
 
It becomes increasingly apparent that bivalence — feeling and 
thinking and reacting solely in terms of binary conflicts — simply isn’t 
enough. There must be some ‘third term’, some ‘third space’, some 
mediation between sign pairs, some middle way, when taking indi-
vidual signs into consideration, or when considering interdependency, 
interrelations, and interactivity among signs (Kalupahana 1986).4 
                                                 
4  Peirce gives us a hint of this middle way (whose origin comes from second 
century Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna (1967)), in his concept of ‘ground’. He tells us 
that a sign’s quality (of category Firstness) implies ‘ground’, its relation 
(Secondness) implies ‘ground’ and some correlate (with some semiotic object), and 
its function, giving rise to meaning (Thirdness) implies ‘ground’, correlate, and its 
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Take King as a sign. The sign can be an image — an icon in the 
most basic sense — in possible interdependency with a host of other 
possible signs (the King as father of the people, for example). It can 
indexically interact with some object, act or happening, with some-
thing other than the sign (the King’s unique beard as an identifying 
feature). Or it can be a symbol, the word ‘King’, in interrelation with 
this particular royal figure and as a member of the class of individuals 
that go by the same name. If King is the sign (representamen), and the 
object, act or happening with which the sign interacts is what usually 
goes as the semiotic object, then there must be some mediator 
(interpretant) capable of mediating between sign and object at the 
same time that it mediates between itself and them.5 
 
 
Figure 1.  The triadic Peircean sign. 
 
This, of course, is of the nature of Peirce’s sign. But not in the form of 
a triangle, as it is often depicted: it is, more properly illustrated, a 
                                                                                                    
interpretant (CP 1.556–.559). ‘Ground’, in this sense, lies outside the parameters of 
Peirce’s three categories; it bears on what he occasionally alludes to as 
‘nothingness’ (Nāgārjuna’s ‘emptiness’) (CP 6.189–222), which, as ‘nothingness’, 
nonetheless ‘contains’ the wherewithal for the emergence of ‘everythingness’, 
including what we take as our ‘physical world’, which is always becoming 
something other than what it was becoming (see Kalupahana 1986; Loy 1989; 
merrell 2010). 
5  Notice that I wish to distinguish between (1) King as material or mental sign, 
(2) ‘King’ as the word, also a sign, which indicates the material or mental sign, and 
(3) King as a member of the items in what Peirce calls the ‘brute’ physical world. 
 
Sign 
Representamen
Semiotic 
Object 
Interpretant
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‘tripod’ (see Figure 1). Notice that, unlike a triangle wherein the 
extremity of each line is connected to an extremity of one of the other 
two lines but not both of them, an extremity of each line of the ‘tripod’ 
links up with that of the other two lines, with the central ‘point’ acting 
as the universal mediator — the possibility of a possible sign. Notice 
that each of the lines can alternately take the role of sign, semiotic 
object, or interactive mediating interpretant; thus the figure is, so to 
speak, ‘democratic’. And notice that, unlike the triangle on a two 
dimensional (customarily Euclidean) plane, the ‘tripod’ image involves 
three dimensional space, and that, rather than fixed, the form is 
polymorphous, processual, perpetually changing (for further on the 
function of the ‘point’, merrell 1997, 2000, 2007, 2010). 
Now, what about creation of a metaphor by way of resemblance? 
Say, King and Lion. King is the sign lending itself to metaphorization, 
Lion is the object-sign of the metaphor, and the interpretant, or 
mediator as it were, creates — in collaboration with the metaphor-
making subject, who is also a sign among signs — metaphorical 
interdependent, interrelated interactivity. We might simply say that the 
mediation creates the message and the meaning, and be done with it. 
But that would be too simple. We, also, are interpretants: we interpret 
the sign, while the sign, mediated by ourselves as mediating inter-
pretants or interpreters, mediates itself with our signs and with us. In 
this manner, we co-participate with our signs in the process of 
bringing about mediation. And what is the yield of this mediation with 
respect to the King-Lion metaphor? Let us provisionally call it 
LionKing. Simple enough, it might seem. 
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But for theoretical purposes, too simple. For this operation could 
easily be qualified in bivalent terms, perhaps as in Figure 2. This image 
could give a false impression of the metaphor, because if there is 
mediation — which must be the case in the process of 
metaphorization — there must be some third term charged with the 
duty of mediating and moderating the two way conflict. Of course one 
might retort that there is no conflict between Kings and Lions. Kings 
are Kings and Lions are Lions, and if there are a few points of 
resemblance between them — powerful, ruler, authoritative voice, 
strength, domination, or whatever — then there are grounds for 
metaphorization, and that’s that. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  A possibly possible sign. 
 
 
However, Figure 2 is actually less bivalent than one might think. 
Notice that there is no direct line between the ‘zero point’ at the 
bottom of the rhombus — which, like the peak of the tripod in Figure 
1, depicts possible possibilities for sign creation — and the uppermost 
 
King Lion
LionKing 
‘Zero point’
Figure 2.   Complementing bivalence.  
 
+
− 
Floyd Merrell  102
portion of the rhombus, where the metaphorical process comes to 
fruition. Notice also that there is a continuous path from the ‘zero 
point’ through Lion to LionKing, and another one through King to 
LionKing, but Lion and King remain unlinked until the metaphor has 
been properly consummated. This implies nonlinear interdependent 
interrelations of complementarity, and context dependency, between 
Lion and King. What I mean by this is that there is a form of ‘logic’ to 
Figure 2, but the ‘logic’ is that of complementarity rather than 
bivalence, of nonlinearity rather than linearity, of context dependence 
rather than context freedom.6 
In terms of this ‘logic’, disjunctive interrelations between Lion and 
King entail: Lion x King = , where ‘disjunction’ includes commonality, 
or ‘areas of possible resemblance’, between one term and the other — 
as in Yin-Yang, where the Yin in Yang and the Yang in Yin are no 
more than possibilities (at the ‘zero point’) until actualized. If Lions 
were Lions and Kings were Kings, and never the twain could meet, with 
no ‘areas of possible resemblance’, then ‘disjunction’ of Lion and King 
would leave us with nothing but the ‘zero point’, zilch. However, given 
the ‘areas of possible resemblance’, when the nonlinear, comple-
mentary metaphorical process comes into play, it is through ‘con-
junction’, addition, or the inclusion, of everything regarding both Lion 
and King. That is: Lion + King = LionKing. Lion and King have in this 
manner been mediated, thus yielding the metaphor. So far, so good. 
And yet, Figure 2 still lacks something. It isn’t processual enough. 
Let us look further. 
 
 
                                                 
6  Neither space nor time is permitted in this essay to give a detailed articulation 
of the makings of Figure 2, as well as Figure 4 below.  These figures are a variation 
of what is called ‘quantum logic’, a nonlinear, context dependent, ‘logic’ of 
complementarity which doesn’t faithfully abide by the classical logical Excluded-
Middle Principle (for relatively non-formal discussions of this alternate ‘logic’ see 
Heelan 1970, 1971, 1983; Putnam 1971, 1983; merrell 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007). 
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3.1. Mediation flows into the scene 
 
Figure 3 offers a processual Peircean triadic rendition of what I have 
dubbed a presign, which is basically included within the concept of the 
‘zero point’ (or, if one wishes, it is implied in Peirce’s ‘ground’). It 
entails no more than possible possibilities for actually signness: the 
emergence of an iconic sign of possible resemblance, an indexical sign 
of the other of possible resemblance, and a symbolic sign mediating 
the ‘areas of possible resemblance’ of the icon to the indexical other. 
The three interchangeable legs of the tripod are endowed with 
values of positivity (+), negativity (−), and mediation (). In that 
order, there is Firstness — what is what it is (becoming) without (yet) 
having entered into interdependent interrelation with any other. There 
is Secondness — what is what it is (becoming) in addition to some 
other, something that is not what it is, with which it has entered into 
interdependent, interrelated interactivity. And there is Thirdness — 
what is what it is (becoming) in addition to its mediating Firstness and 
Secondness and at the same time mediating itself through interrelated 
interaction with both of them. 
Thus we can have: (1) the unmediated icon as a possible metaphor 
through resemblance with some other, (2) the unmediated index after 
the iconic sign has entered into interdependent interrelated inter-
activity with some other (semiotic object) without their (yet) becoming 
mediated, and (3) the mediating symbol, whose role brings the meta-
phorical process into the light of day. Resemblance, in this context 
specifically metaphorical resemblance, begins as mere possible possibi-
lity at the central ‘point’, contained within the ‘zero point’ (Figure 3), 
which gives rise to: (1) possibility (iconicity), (2) interdependent inter-
activity between sign possibility and some possible other (indexicality), 
and (3) that which interrelatedly has become apparent through 
possible mediation (symbolicity). 
To the question ‘Who or what mediates the mediating , or Thirdness, 
with Firstness and Secondness?’, the response is: We do, all of us, as a 
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community of sign makers and takers! And we do, as, ourselves, signs 
among signs, as interpretants and interpreters of the signs we make and 
take, and as interpretants and interpreters of ourselves as signs! 
 
 
3.2. Mediation as process 
 
That much said, consider Figure 4, a contradictory complementary 
coalescent lattice emerging out of Figure 3, or the ‘zero point’. At the 
first tier of the lattice, ‘King’ (the principle word-sign, replacing +) and 
‘Lion’ (the possible word-sign, replacing −) are the terms as they are 
ordinarily used in the literal rather than metaphorical sense, while 1, 
the mediating, interpretive function (interpretant), brings implications 
of conventional attributes with which the two signs in question are 
endowed (powerful, ruler, authoritative voice, strength, domineering, 
and so on). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Contradictory complementary coalescence. 
 
 
At the second tier of the nonlinear, context dependent, lattice of 
complementarity, Lion image-sign (−) and King image-sign (+) are the 
first two signs now placed within a metaphorizing context such that 
2 highlights those attributes they have in common, given their 
emerging areas of resemblance. What they have in common must now 
interactively interrelate with both Lion and King: the two terms cannot 
‘Lion’‘King’ 
Lion King
‘Ling-Kion’
1 
2
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be separated, but must be included in the same context in order that 
their common attributes might enter into the metaphorizing process. 
But why ‘Ling-Kion’ at the uppermost point of the lattice? — one is 
certainly asking. Because the metaphorical process creates some new 
sign with a polymorphized meaning; hence the need for altering the 
symbol in the manner of portmanteau words (‘Ling’ = ‘Lion’ + ‘King’; 
‘Kion’ = ‘King’ + ‘Lion’) (see merrell 2007 for further, and Kauffman 
2001, 2002 on the semiotics of portmanteau signs).7 
Given the increased complexity of this lattice, we have ‘King’ and 
‘Lion’, the word-signs implying the material or mental signs, King and 
Lion, and the yields of disjunction (x, product) and conjunction (+, 
sum), where disjunction indicates movement along a path downward 
until they meet, and conjunction indicates movement along a path 
upward until they meet (see the Appendix, for further). The possible 
interdependent interrelatedness of the Figure 4 lattice is as follows: 
 
‘King’ x ‘Lion’ =  (in the ordinary literal meaning of the terms, 
they are mutually exclusive) 
‘King’ + ‘Lion’ = 2 
Lion x ‘King’ =  (Lion as metaphorizing process and ‘King’ 
according to the word’s ordinary literal meaning are mutually 
exclusive) 
Lion + ‘King’ = ‘Ling-Kion’ 
King x 1 = 1 
King + 1 = King 
                                                 
7  At this juncture I should also reveal that this portmanteau phenomena is 
precisely that used by Nelson Goodman in his New Riddle of Induction (1965) 
where he creates the mutually interpenetrating terms ‘Grue’ and ‘Bleen’ as 
alternatives to ‘Green’ and ‘Blue’ (see also merrell 2007, 2010).  This use of 
portmanteau phenomena is not as outlandish as one might expect, since in 
quantum theory it was once soberly proposed that wave and particle 
complementarity should be endowed with the synthetic label, ‘Wavicle’. 
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Lion x 2 =  (the product must be the ‘zero point’ since the other 
member of the context, King, is absent) 
Lion + 2 = ‘Ling-Kion’ (or King + 2 = ‘Ling-Kion’) 
And so on 
 
Thus the nonlinear, context dependent ‘logic’ of complementarity 
involved in polymorphic sign change processes, beginning with 
resemblance, and interactivity of the resemblance with some other, 
which then spills into interrelated symbolicity. 
 
 
4. Vaguely generalizing the lattice 
 
The terms in Table 2 can be, and among Western observers often are, 
taken for bivalent dualisms. Erroneous assumption, we’ve previously 
noted. Thus I placed ‘paradigm’ and ‘syntagm’ in quotes. The fact of 
the matter is that Day-Night, and so on, merge into one another 
through complementarity; they are actually quite comfortable within 
the Figure 4 lattice. ‘Day’ is ‘Day’ and ‘Night’ is ‘Night’, dichotomously 
speaking, at the lower tier of the lattice, and 1 brings them together 
as an antagonistic pair in the conventional sense, with one pole of the 
opposition potentially taking precedence over the other pole according 
to the circumstances, as if there were no more than a gaping chasm 
between them. 
However, Day/Night becomes Day-Night — complementarily 
rather than dichotomously — according to nonlinear, context 
dependent complementarity thinking. This requires the upper tier of 
the lattice, where Day and Night are nonlinearly and complementarily 
mediated (2), following conventional mediation (1). In this process, 
Day becomes tinged with Light, and vice versa, such that there is a 
continuum of possible possibilities rather than merely an empty chasm 
between them (hence the hyphen in place of the virgule when 
combining the two terms). While this process might not appear very 
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appropriate for metaphoricity, as was the Figure 4 case, it is the same 
process insofar as there exists the possibility for fusion, for what I 
labeled above as the contradictory complementary coalescence of Day 
and Night, giving rise to the emergence of what we might venture to 
write as ‘Dight-Lay’. In other words, like Yin-Yang, a bit of Day in 
Night and Night in Day provides for a hint — however vague — of 
complementarity and ‘areas of possible resemblance’ between the one 
and the other such that they can merge into each another and manifest 
the vagueness in any and all signs of particularity and generality.8 
But why, one might now wish to counter, are these bastardized 
conglomerated and inordinately clumsy nouns, ‘Dight-Lay’ and ‘Ling-
Kion’, necessary? If for no other reason, they are necessary for the 
purpose of illustration. The word-sign, ‘King’, is not the flesh and 
blood King himself, and neither is the material or mental image-sign 
King literally the King; likewise, ‘Lion’ is not a Lion, nor is it a Lion 
image-sign. In composite form, by means of their complementarity 
and their hint of some commonality or other, they have become 
something else, ‘Ling-Kion’, and they are still, and will remain, in the 
                                                 
8  At the outset it would appear that there is hardly any conceivable ‘area of 
possible resemblance’ regarding Day-Night — or Yin-Yang for that matter. 
However, I have suggested elsewhere (merrell 2005, 2007), following certain 
aspects of Buddhism and quantum theory as I understand them, that the very idea 
of a line of demarcation between one term and another presumably contradictory 
term remains fuzzy and vague, like the terms themselves, since there is invariably a 
hint of the one in the other and the other in the one; hence it mediates, and brings 
about, their contradictory complementary coalescent character, rendering them 
neither purely the one (Day) nor the other (Night), but to a greater or lesser 
degree coalescent, and convergent. Moreover, Peirce writes at length that there can 
be no absolutely final general sign, for no sign that is so complete in terms of its 
generality that it cannot be completed a bit further; hence within every sign of 
generality, there is always at least a touch of vagueness; and no sign is so vague that 
it is completely devoid of some element of generality when so conceived as a sign; 
hence within every vague sign there is always some implication of generality (all 
this is, once again, comparable to the Yin-Yang principle) (CP 5.441–466). 
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process of becoming something other than what they were becoming. 
This is the nature of the processual complementarity lattice. The very 
process, spilling out and into ‘Dight-Lay’, bears witness to the virtually 
unlimited array of possible possibilities for spontaneously emergent 
fresh and new sign variations through their ‘area of possible 
resemblance’. 
This is to imply that there is a virtually unlimited number of 
possible possibilities between one term and the other of what might 
otherwise be taken for an intransigently antagonistic bivalent pair of 
terms. It also implies that there simply is no ‘is’, for whatever there 
apparently ‘is’, is always in the process of change, however minute. 
And it implies that no matter how precisely honed we might wish to 
sharpen a term, as mentioned in footnote 8, it is invariably tinged with 
a degree of vagueness. For solely by way of vagueness (chiefly of the 
nature of Firstness) can new signs in new flasks or old signs in new 
flasks spring forth as particular signs here and now (chiefly of the 
nature of Secondness), that are — often arbitrarily as it were — 
elevated to the status of generality (chiefly of the nature of Thirdness). 
But, once again, no matter how complete we might wish to make our 
general signs, there will always be some vagueness, and perhaps even 
inconsistency, which will serve to issue a call for some variation, or 
perhaps a wholesale replacement, of what we might have taken our 
sign to be. 
Now let us ratchet the lattice up a notch by contemplating its 
embrace of nouns and their attributes. 
 
 
5. What is becoming resists fixed labels 
 
The very notion of complementarity tends to go against the grain of 
our Western ways of logical and rational thinking when we consider 
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such sign combinations as ‘a white swan’.9 The complementarity 
principle, for instance, tells us that ‘“A white swan” is not a “swan”’. 
Absurd, we might wish to retort, for ‘swan’ refers to a class of 
organisms while ‘white’ refers to their color, and to say the one is to 
say — at least by implication — the other. However, naming the color 
is not the same as naming the general class of organisms; and yet, since 
nouns and adjectives, and different forms of speech as well, can be 
mixed, within contexts regarding everyday talk there’s hardly any 
problem. 
How so? ‘Swan’ is a general term alluding to the set of all particular 
‘swans’, and ‘white’ is an attribute once considered common to all 
‘swans’ in the general sense. ‘A white swan’ combines a particular with 
a general, ‘a swan’ with ‘white’, such that the general is as if it were a 
particular member of itself. However, did not Bertrand Russell (1910) 
warn us that ‘swan’, as a general category, cannot be a member of the 
class of all particular ‘swans’? In other words, a map (part) is not the 
territory (whole); it is part of the whole, since if the map is read from 
within the territory it images, it must be included within that whole, 
which would contain a replica of itself, and that replica would contain 
its own replica, and so on, without end. The part isn’t tantamount to 
the whole, and the whole shouldn’t be considered coequal with one of 
its parts; by the same token, ‘a white swan’ is not tantamount to the 
general term ‘swan’. The one is a particularity and the other is a 
generality. 
Indeed, during one of his explorations of Australia, Captain James 
Cook (1728–1779) spied some strange swan like sort of aviary that 
were not ‘white’ but ‘black’, which eventually led to the concession 
that most swans are ‘white’ but some, namely a subspecies in Australia, 
are ‘black’. ‘Swan’ as a general category proved incomplete, and it 
became a bit more completely qualified by the addition of ‘black’ to the 
                                                 
9  See Graham (1992: 99–100), who within a comparable context uses a ‘white 
horse’ example from Chinese philosophy. 
Floyd Merrell  110
customary qualification ‘white’, and then, the erstwhile inconsistency 
involving the possibility of both ‘black’ and ‘white swans’ became (at 
least temporarily) consistent. Placing this polymorphic amendment 
within our complementarity lattice (Figure 4), we have the class of 
‘Swans’ as either ‘White’ or ‘Black’ at the first tier, with 1 dictating 
‘White’ and nothing but ‘White’, since ‘Black’ swans are deemed out of 
the range of possibilities. At the second tier, Black and White break out 
of their bivalent limitations and become complementary, with 2 
serving to highlight the commonality between them as subspecies of 
the same species. And at the uppermost point of the lattice, we would 
have the portmanteau expression, ‘Blite-Whack’. 
In other words, particular swans can be either ‘Black’ or ‘White’, so 
the general class of swans contains both ‘Black’ and ‘White’ indivi-
duals; yet, given the incompleteness of any and all generalities, it may 
be the case that at some future time and place there may be a swan 
exemplification that is neither ‘White’ nor ‘Black’ but of some other 
characteristic color. We have, once again, Peirce: no general sign is so 
complete that it cannot take on some amendment, because it always 
conceals some degree of vagueness; thus generality and vagueness are 
complementary, and they cannot be simply reduced to mutual 
exclusivity. 
Basically the same complementarity process inheres in the other-
wise conflicting terms in Table 1. As a case in point, ‘White’ and 
‘Black’ with respect to ‘race’ in the United States once had relatively 
positive attributes usually, though not always, linked to ‘White’ and 
relatively negative attributes usually, though not always, habitually 
attached to ‘Black’. This is the first tier. Then, at the second tier, after 
considerable protest and violence and Civil Rights legislation was put 
into effect, and following a series of sometimes painful changes of 
mind and heart, ‘White’ began slowly polymorphizing into White and 
‘Black’ into Black, made possible by their appropriate mediation. That 
is, the words, ‘White’ and ‘Black’, began becoming something other 
than what they were becoming, as the signs, White and Black, whether 
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in the world ‘out there’ as material signs or the world ‘in here’ as 
mental signs. Finally, something new emerged, which we might label 
‘Whack-Blite’ with a nod to the lattice, hopefully revealing some 
change of behavior regarding material and mental worlds and the 
language use accompanying them. 
In short, it isn’t a matter of the more things change the more they 
stay the same, as the saying goes, but rather, the effort to force things 
into changeless conceptual schemes never succeeds in halting the 
inevitability of change. 
 
 
6. On resemblance, in spite of the very idea of 
conceptual schemes 
 
Yet, when current politically correct voices allude to ‘Blacks’ and 
‘Whites’ with the assumption that their history of culture laden 
experiences leaves them talking past each other rather than engaging 
in viable dialogue, they are often implying holistic, virtually incom-
mensurable conceptual schemes by talking along the lines of Jakob-
sonian ‘paradigms’ consisting of terms in conflict: ‘Black/White’. 
In this unfortunately bivalent manner, there are basically two 
antagonistic poles: Black culture/White culture, Black language(and 
vernacular)/White language(and vernacular), and the core terms, 
‘Black/White’. Consequently, semiotic subjects within one set of self-
contained, self-reflexive, presumably self-sufficient conceptual sche-
mes (from White culture), cannot help but talk past other semiotic 
subjects (from Black culture), as long as they all remain ensconced in 
their own world and conceptual schemes. And they will continue to 
talk past each other, because their conceptual schemes are virtually 
incommensurable, and because they enjoy no genuine complementary, 
context dependent, nonlinear mediation (as in Figure 4). 
Donald Davidson (1984, 1986), for one, has a different story to tell 
about the viability of incommensurability. Departing from Willard V. 
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O. Quine’s meaning inscrutability and nontranslatability of conceptual 
schemes, Davidson argues that we should forget about conceptual 
schemes altogether.10 A conceptual scheme — or by extension a 
Kuhnian ‘paradigm’ — presumably cuts the world up in a particular 
way to yield a discontinuous, static set of entities. But our world, 
Davidson tells us, isn’t tantamount to an aggregate of fixed terms and 
their meanings. It isn’t like a mass noun that takes precedence over 
individual terms and meanings, nor is it a set of distinct count nouns 
or generic nouns the collection of which makes up a monolithic whole. 
Rather, it is we who organize our world by pragmatically choosing our 
words and putting them together in somewhat loose, fluctuating, 
flowing, and altering ways, in order to talk among ourselves about 
ourselves and others, and about our world. 
In this manner, we have no clear cut meanings with respect to our 
organizing massive general nouns (universe, nature, nation, and so 
on) unless those nouns are made up of implicitly or explicitly 
acknowledged particulars (galaxies and stars, mountains and forests, 
leaders and people). For instance, if we wish to organize our closet, we 
arrange the particular things therein, and the idea of our ‘closet’ 
undergoes meaning change; but if we are simply told to reorganize the 
meaning of ‘closet’, we are at a loss for an immediate answer. How 
would we go about reorganizing ‘ocean’? Pollute our oceans with oil 
spills, kill untold species of fish, disappear islands due to global 
warming. ‘Ocean’ undergoes a change of meaning, but it is due to 
changes of particulars contained within the holistic meaning of ‘ocean’. 
‘Ocean’ is a mass noun consisting of countless atoms and mole-
cules, and coral reefs and fish and seagoing vessels and so on. The 
word implies a collection of individuals that we talk about in 
somewhat our own way; nevertheless since we have a ‘feel’ for these 
                                                 
10  In doing so, Davidson builds on Quine’s (1953, 1969) argument against ‘two 
dogmas of empiricism’, the analysis/synthesis distinction and reductionism, by 
proposing abolishment of a ‘third dogma’, form/content, or conceptual schemes. 
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individuals and the noun encompassing them, we go on with our talk, 
and we usually get along rather swimmingly, whether in the same 
language or across languages. We don’t draw the line in precisely the 
same way between individual words, nor is our all encompassing word 
the same as that of other interlocutors. Nevertheless, we more often 
than not manage to communicate, because we have a feel for our 
language and our world and a feel for those with whom we are com-
municating (compare meaning change in this regard to the impli-
cations of Figure 4). 
This notion of generals and particulars recalls Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) 
example of the person who was given a tour around a university 
campus past the various buildings and other points of interest, during 
which time he broke in with the question: ‘Yes, but where’s the 
university?’ ‘University’? It is a general noun that enjoys no physical 
counterpart as do ‘chemistry building’, ‘library’, ‘students’, ‘professors’, 
and such. Yet it is a word we with the greatest of ease utter alongside 
nouns interrelated with their particular physical counterparts on 
campus. How would we reorganize the University? Construct a new 
chemistry building closer to the engineering building where it 
properly belongs, relocate the student union next to the cluster of 
dormitories for the students’ convenience, and so on. And it’s all done 
under the umbrella term, ‘University’. Everybody on campus ordi-
narily understands talk about their ‘University’; some agree with the 
reorganization while others disagree; they all lift themselves up by the 
seat of their pants when talking, because they are using words with 
respect to particular objects in the ‘University’ in hitherto rather novel 
ways, perhaps distorting a few meanings here and there, bending 
syntactic rules slightly, with voice inflections and gestures to get their 
point across. 
And they communicate, usually quite effectively. There is no fixed 
conceptual scheme dictating what they’ll say and how they’ll say it. 
Rather, there is loose and limber pragmatic give-and-take (of the sort 
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proposed above with respect to Figure 4 accounting for polymorphic 
sign change). 
 
 
7. Coping, when language breaks down 
 
Davidson is perhaps nowhere more effective than in his talk about Ms. 
Malaprop, who comes from Richard Sheridan’s play, The Rivals (1930). 
She is portrayed as a person who often doesn’t know the proper word 
for the occasion, and as a result, in her effort to communicate, she 
tends to blurt out sentences that according to rigidly defined rules of 
speech would have no meaning. At one point in the play she means to 
say ‘a nice arrangement of epithets’ but she says ‘a nice derangement 
of epitaphs’. 
According to Davidson’s interpretation of Ms. Malaprop’s blunder, 
the linguistic object-sign of her ‘Epitaphs’ is ‘Epithets’, and the most 
likely meaning of her verbal error is likewise that of Epithets. The 
interpreter takes Malaprop’s sign as a mistake and assumes it should 
have been ‘Epithets’, and he interprets Malaprop’s utterance according 
to his assumption arrived at through the orthographic resemblance 
between the words involved (see Figure 5). The conjunction of 
Malaprop’s sign and object within the context of the conversation 
gives an approximation to the interpreter’s meaning of Malaprop’s 
blooper; the conjunction of the interpreter’s sign and object gives a 
rough parallel to Malaprop’s mistake. The disjunction, overlap, or 
‘area of possible resemblance’ of Malaprop’s sign and its intended 
object (‘epitaph/epithet’) would under normal circumstances be next 
to nil ( ); the disjunction of the interpreter’s sign and object 
(‘epitaph  epithet’), given the adjustment of ‘possible resemblance’ he 
makes, affords him a viable interpretation. (In other words, the 
interpretation cannot be adequately intelligible at the level of 
Malaprop’s ‘Epitaphs-Epithets’ sign-object combination at the first tier 
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of Figure 5, but must be adjusted at the second tier level of the 
interpreter’s Epithets-Epithets combination.) 
 
 
Figure 5.  Complementing rhetoric. 
  
This is to say that the disjunction of the interpreter’s sign or object and 
his interpretation, if taken at face value, would also be virtually nil. In 
order that a proper interpretation may be forthcoming, the interpreter 
must take Malaprop’s sign, object, and interpretation into due 
consideration within the context of the conversation, and since the 
sign involves incommensurability made complementarity, if such 
complementarity had not been forthcoming through the interpreter’s 
astute reassessment of Malaprop’s linguistic dissonance, the yield 
would have remained none other than virtually nil. The entire context 
of Malaprop’s utterances, including signs, their linguistic objects, 
imagined mental signs and possible alternate objects created by the 
interpreter, past signs in Malaprop’s and the interpreter’s experience, 
and the socio-physical context of the utterance, must be taken into 
consideration. It’s a holistic enterprise, for sure. 
We are not dealing with a theory of meaning of individual words as 
if we had a dictionary programmed in our heads, or as if we had an 
encyclopedia of our past experiences, our present experience and 
anticipations of our future experiences in mind, all according to a 
coded, static set of signs and fixed rules for their combinations. We are 
dealing with a theory of interpretation (the imaginative creation of 
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‘Epithet’
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interpretants via ‘areas of possible resemblance’), of meaning 
processing within the flow of which everything is always becoming 
something other than what it was becoming. It is not a matter of what 
the signs the maker of those signs means according to some fixed, 
uncontextualized code, but what the maker means by the signs within 
the whole of their context. No sign is genuinely a sign unless and until 
it is a contextually interpreted sign.11 
 
 
8. Playing it by ear, then 
 
More specifically, according to Davidson, the interpreter uses his prior 
theory and passing theory to understand the speaker; the speaker uses 
her own prior theory and passing theory to guide her speech. For the 
speaker, the theories involve assumptions regarding how the 
interpreter will interpret her; for the interpreter, they involve prior 
assumptions and expectations that are adjusted by way of his passing 
theory in his ongoing process of understanding the speaker’s message. 
Fortunately, people generally speak and interpret in similar ways. 
Davidson’s ‘radical interpretation’ doesn’t require speaker and 
interpreter to inhabit the same language or different languages in 
basically the same way. Yet, if speaker and interpreter are forthright 
and honest, they will more often than not be able to make the 
necessary adjustments so as to communicate from ‘a nice derange-
ment of epitaphs’ to ‘a nice arrangements of epithets’. Thus Davidson 
writes: 
 
                                                 
11  Eleanor Rosch’s work on ‘prototypes’ (1973, 1977, 1983), revealing this 
amorphous nature of categories and generalities, is germane to this essay, 
especially given that, in collaboration with Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson 
(1993), she also reveals the implications of Buddhism and the contemplative 
tradition to her notion of pliable thinking and semantics. 
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[T]here are no rules for arriving at passing theories, no rules in any strict sense, 
as opposed to rough maxims and methodological generalities. A passing theory 
really is like a theory at least in this, that it is derived by wit, luck, and wisdom 
from a private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of the ways people get their 
point across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the 
diction [rule fudging] are most likely. (Davidson 1986: 446) 
 
In Davidson’s conception (Davidson 1986: 442), for the hearer, the 
prior theory “expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret an 
utterance of the speaker, while the passing theory is how he does 
interpret the utterance” (by means of ‘areas of possible resemblance’). 
For the speaker, the prior theory is what she “believes the interpreter’s 
prior theory to be” (ibid.), while her passing theory is the theory she 
“intends the interpreter to use?” (ibid.). In other words, if the 
interpreter knows Mrs. Malaprop, he knows she often confuses quasi-
homonyms, and his expectations will be geared toward that tendency. 
His prior theory will be dependent upon his expectations, and his 
passing theory will be adjusted according to how the uttered pair of 
words and their quasi-homonyms interact. ‘Epitaphs’ and ‘epithets’ 
were not necessarily interrelated in his prior theory, but when they 
emerged, one explicitly and the other implicitly, one actual and the 
other possible, they interacted, and he made the necessary adjustments 
in order to interpret the utterance (Dasenbrock 1999). 
In another way of putting this, Mrs. Malaprop leaves her utterance 
vague. In Peirce’s conception of vague and general signs, it is up to the 
sign maker to further clarify a vague sign, and it is the sign taker’s task 
to further specify a sign’s generality (CP 5.505–516). Mrs. Malaprop, 
unfortunately, says what she says, vaguely, and leaves it at that. What 
is the interpreter to do? Take the vague clues Mrs. Malaprop reveals 
and (1) imagine, by means of ‘areas of possible resemblance’, what the 
general consequences might be if her utterance were interrelated and 
interacted with some possible combination (‘epitaph’ and ‘epithet’, 
‘disarrangement’ and ‘arrangement’), (2) consider the particular 
effects of these consequences, and then (3) adjust his present 
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premonitions regarding these consequences in view of his prior 
expectations, and see where it takes him.12 
Davidson also uses an example from Lewis Carroll’s Humpty 
Dumpty, who tells Alice that when he says ‘glory’ he means ‘a nice 
knock-down argument’, and that he is entirely free to decide what he 
means by any and all of his signs. That is, he creates a pair of explicit 
signs, he leaves them inordinately vague, with no further clarification, 
and it is up to Alice to bring some modicum of order to the confusion. 
However, Alice’s perplexity grows because she is unable to take the 
two signs as generalities, interdependently interrelate them, and put 
them into interaction with one another, bringing order to the signs’ 
vagueness and their radically incomplete generality by imagining what 
Humpty Dumpty might mean by them, and arrive at a tentative 
interpretation. Unfortunately, within the context of the conversation, 
Humpty Dumpty leaves her few clues for interpreting his utterance. 
Apparently, Davidson’s ‘radical interpretation’ is not exclusively a 
linguistic affair, but rather, it involves imagination (Firstness), 
consideration of the possible consequences of sign interdependent, 
interrelated interaction (Thirdness), and the interpreter’s own 
interdependent, interrelated interaction with the signs (Secondness) in 
possibly arriving at some provisional answer… 
 
 
9. More often than not, by improvising 
 
Davidson’s Malaprop example illustrates the importance of inter-
pretation within a process that is linguistic and, contextually speaking, 
also extralinguistic. It is linguistic insofar as the rules of ‘standard 
English’ emerge and allow both sign maker and sign taker to ‘get away 
                                                 
12  This process, by the way, is roughly that of what Peirce calls the ‘pragmatic 
maxim’ (CP 5.402, also 5.2, 5.9, 5.18, 5.427, for a discussion see Nesher 1983, 
1990). 
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with something’, namely, customary or conventional sign use. In 
Davidson’s words, by ‘getting away with it’: 
 
[T]he interpreter comes to the occasion of utterance armed with a theory that 
tells him (or so he believes) what an arbitrary utterance of the speaker means. 
The speaker then says something with the intention that it will be so interpreted. 
In fact this way is not provided for in the interpreter’s theory. But the speaker is 
nevertheless understood; the interpreter adjusts his theory so that it yields the 
speaker’s intended interpretation. The speaker has “gotten away with it”. The 
speaker may or may not […] know that he has got away with anything; the 
interpreter may or may not know that the speaker intended to get away with 
anything. What is common to the cases is that the speaker expects to be, and is, 
interpreted as the speaker intended although the interpreter did not have a 
correct theory in advance. (Davidson 1986: 440) 
 
In addition to a linguistic theory or set of conventions that precisely 
and explicitly guides speaker and interpreter, there is an extralinguistic 
communicative context, and there are signs of greater or lesser 
vagueness and inconsistency, and of greater or lesser incompleteness 
and ambiguity. Speaker and interpreter interact with their signs within 
the linguistic and extralinguistic context that happens to have emerged, 
and they make and take signs as best they can by ‘getting away with it’ 
or departing from what are ordinarily taken to be the rules and 
conventions. In Davidson’s (1986: 440) words: “We do not need 
bizarre anecdotes or wonderlands to make the point. We all get away 
with it all the time: understanding the speech of others depends on it?” 
Given the element of vagueness in any and all signs, the notion of 
‘getting away with it’ carries the implication that prior theories — the 
guess a speaker makes about how her utterance may be interpreted 
and the guess a listener makes about how to interpret an utterance — 
never exactly match (at the ‘epithet’-‘epitaph’ tier of Figure 5), for 
speaker and listener can never know precisely what strategy the other 
has in mind in a particular communicative context. The speaker can 
never know precisely how the interpreter will take what she says, nor 
can the interpreter be certain in advance about the accuracy of his 
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interpretation of her words, since his prior theory constitutes only a 
starting place for interpretation. Both speaker and listener possess 
their own prior theories that swivel and swerve and change as they 
speak and listen. Together, they arrive at a roughly comparable yet 
vague passing theory that enables them to understand one another (at 
the epithet-epithet tier of Figure 5). Once understanding emerges (at 
the uppermost point of Figure 5), the passing theory fades to become 
part of an altered prior theory in view of how speaker and listener ‘got 
away with something’. And, I must emphasize, they do this by im-
provising, by finding convergence between ‘areas of possible 
resemblance’. 
Thus we communicate by making informed guesses, guided by 
imagination’s dance. We improvise the dance as we go along, and, 
within the sphere of Firstness, it cannot be rigidly codified, systema-
tized, or taught explicitly — it can only be taught by experience, by 
example, and by practical application. Neither prior nor passing 
theories can be predicted in advance. They emerge spontaneously. 
One’s linguistic prowess comes to bear in interpretation, for sure. But 
linguistic rules and regulations, and conventional language use, are of 
little consequence unless speakers and listeners know their way about 
in their everyday felt, imagined, sensed, and perceived world (entailing 
chiefly Firstness and Secondness), and their conceptual meanderings 
within that world (entailing Thirdness). 
Satisfactory communication depends on our ability to feel, imagine, 
sense, and perceive and conceive the beliefs and intentions of others, 
and our interpretation depends on our creating imaginary scenes and 
in the blink of an eye tacitly taking in the possible consequences of 
these contrary-to-fact scenes. Since these imaginary scenes garner 
neither respect for, nor do they bear any malice toward, any linguistic 
code, we have no absolutely fixed, predetermined set of ideas or 
strategies: we are never adequately prepared in advance to make sense 
of our world. We have no static conceptual scheme that tells us what 
our world will be before we enter into communicative interaction. Our 
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passing theories are not simply a linguistic construct. They involve 
context dependent, and interdependent, interrelated interaction 
between speaker, hearer, and their signs. 
 
 
10. In order to keep the process alive 
 
Innovation and improvisation are at the very heart of communication. 
Whatever prior theories interpreters may have, their passing theories 
rarely fail to alter those prior theories during the interpretive process. 
Thus every speaker, painter, dancer, composer and musician, and 
every scholar, during any and all aspects of human living, usually 
manage to ‘get away with it’, to deviate slightly, and even radically 
depart, from normal conventions of sign use. This involves meaning 
within contexts, and within contexts of contexts. Given this holistic 
enterprise, there is no problem in extending Davidson’s theory to the 
range of all possible Peircean sign types, from icons to indices to 
symbols, and their myriad combinations. 
Within a strictly linguistic or symbolic context, the absurdity of 
Humpty Dumpty’s statement ‘When I use a word it means just what I 
choose it to mean’ becomes obvious. When he tells Alice ‘There’s glory 
for you’, he cannot effectively and communicatively mean what he 
says within the context of the conversation, because there’s no way, 
pragmatically speaking, that he can be communicating with Alice, 
since there is hardly any ‘area of possible resemblance’ between 
‘There’s glory’ and ‘There’s a nice knockdown argument’. 
When Alice says ‘I don’t know what you mean by “glory”’, Humpty 
Dumpty cryptically retorts ‘Of course you don’t—til I tell you’.13 If 
                                                 
13  This is what I alluded to above regarding Peirce’s notion of vagueness; that is, 
it is up to the speaker to further specify the meaning of the vague sign, and it is the 
hearer’s task to further determine the meaning of the general sign.  In other words, 
if the hearer’s passing theory doesn’t hone in on the proper meaning, there’s 
hardly any way she can interpret the sign and give it the proper meaning within 
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they had been communicating, Humpty Dumpty shouldn’t have to tell 
Alice what he means. She would be able to divine his meanings by 
creating a pattern of converging resemblances. And Alice’s adjustments 
to Humpty Dumpty’s utterance would have emerged through iconic 
resemblances and indexical interrelated interaction before symbols or 
words could emerge into the light of day. Properly taking context into 
due consideration requires considerably more than linguistic signs. 
Thus Davidson (1986: 440) declares that “there is no such thing as 
a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers 
and linguists have supposed”. By the same token, in view of this essay’s 
content, we might surmise that there is no such thing as signs, not if 
signs are anything like what many philosophers — and even some 
semioticians — have supposed. The problem is that many scholars 
have customarily taken meaning according to some relatively static set 
of symbolic signs (code) and the rules for their combination, rather 
than genuine semiosis as the process of signs that are always becoming 
something other than what they were becoming, through converging 
iconic resemblances, indexical others with which they interdependently 
interact, and interrelated symbolic expressions. 
Which is to say that, as semiosis goes, so also our understanding of 
ourselves, our culture, and our physical world — by way of ‘areas of 
possible resemblance’. 
 
 
11. In conclusion 
 
The Peirce based notion of resemblance developed in this essay entails 
fuzziness regarding the categories, sign types, and the nature of signs, 
as they travel through time and space. This fuzziness reveals the need 
                                                                                                    
the arena of sign generalities; and if the speaker’s sign remains inordinately vague, 
he has little chance of communicating with the hearer, so he doesn’t effectively 
know the meaning of his sign within that particular context. 
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for a ‘logic’ of broader scope than bivalent principles, although this 
more encompassing ‘logic’ must incorporate bivalent principles as a 
subset. All told, this ‘logic’, at the same time of greater generality and 
greater vagueness than bivalent logic, is best qualified as nonlinear, 
context dependent, and of contradictory complementary coalescence, in 
view of the processual nature of all signs. 
 
 
Appendix. On the lattice 
 
The Figure 4 lattice flies against formal Aristotelian principles: it is 
nonlinear, complementary, and context-dependent, according to the 
following characteristics: 
1. The connectives, ‘and’ (+), and ‘or’ (x), are ‘quantum logical’, of 
the nature of logical principles developed specifically for quantum 
theory; they do not abide by the demands of classical Aristotelian logic 
in terms of the Excluded-Middle. This is to say that the ordering is no 
more than partial; it is not linear. 
2. Partial ordering entails nonlinearity, or at best, incomplete 
linearity. Linearity is the case in the following sequences extracted 
from Figure 4, beginning with : 
  ‘King’  2  ‘Ling-Kion’ 
  ‘Lion’  2  ‘Ling-Kion’ 
  1  King  ‘Ling-Kion’ 
And so on. 
3. However, the following paths are not possible: 
‘King’  2 but not ‘King’  ‘Lion’ 
1  Lion but not 1  2 
And so on. 
4. The lattice entails context-dependency. For example, context 1 
is within context King, but not the other way around, context ‘Lion’ is 
within context 2 but not the other way around, and context King is 
within context ‘Ling-Kion’, but not the other way around, and so on. 
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Thus, moving up the lattice by conjunction yields greater, all-inclusive 
contexts: ‘higher’ contexts include the whole of ‘lower’ contexts. For 
example, 2 contains everything contained within both ‘King’ and 
‘Lion’. 
5. The combination of all entities in the lattice proceeds toward 
‘Ling-Kion’. What has been termed ‘emptiness’ or ‘nothingness’ in this 
essay is the source of any and all contexts; it gives rise to , and then to 
all possible paths within the lattice. 
6. Moving down the lattice by disjunction limits the context, since it 
entails inclusion of no more than what one term and another one have 
in common. For example, the product of Lion and King is 1, which is 
to say that the context of 1 includes only what is common to Lion 
and King. 
7. Moving down the lattice, in this sense, is roughly tantamount to 
formal disjunction, or ‘x’, but, in addition, it involves context 
dependency. In other words, disjunction, or ‘the product of’, limits the 
context. Thus we have the following: 
Lion x King = 1 
1 x King = 1 
1 x ‘Lion’ =  
And so on. 
8. Moving up the lattice is roughly tantamount to formal 
conjunction, or ‘+’, and it also involves context dependency. In other 
words, conjuntion, or ‘the sum of’, entails contexts of greater breadth. 
Thus: 
‘King’ + ‘Lion’ = 2  
King + 1 = King 
King + Lion = ‘Ling-Kion’ 
9. Disjunction selects what two or more terms have in common, as 
particulars, in line with either/or formal Aristotelian bivalence: 
true/false, black/white, self/other, and so on. Conjunction includes the 
totality of all possible implications of two or more terms, which is to 
say that the door is always left open, and the possibility exists, for 
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some term that was implicit to become explicit. In this sense 
conjunction allows for interdependent, interrelated interaction between 
two incomplete terms such that some new term may emerge that is 
neither the one nor the other but something else. Hence novel 
combinations can always emerge from what we might consider the 
Included-Middle rather than Excluded-Middle, and then move up the 
lattice to make way for new possible combinations. This is portrayed 
in ‘Ling-Kion’, which in an incomplete sense contains something of 
both ‘King’ and ‘Lion’, and at the same time, strictly speaking, it is 
neither ‘King’ nor ‘Lion’ (much in the order of Yin-Yang). 
10. Thus insofar as the lattice allows for linear transitions (as in 2.) 
within local domains, the lattice as a whole is of nonlinear nature (as 
in 3.–9.). 
 
 
References 
 
Bell, John S. 1989. Six possible worlds of quantum mechanics. In: Alleén, S. (ed.), 
Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts, and Sciences. (Proceeding of Nobel 
Symposium 65). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 359–373. 
Bohr, Niels 1934. Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Chiasson, Phyllis 2002. Peirce’s logic of vagueness. Online: 
http://www.digitalpeirce.org. 
CP = Peirce, Charles Sanders 1931–1935. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders 
Peirce, vols. 1–6. [Hartshorne, C.; Weiss, P. (eds.)] Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press [In-text references are to CP, followed by volume and 
paragraph numbers]. 
Dasenbrock, Reed Way 1999. Locating Donald Davidson and literary language. In: 
Hahn, L. E. (ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson. LaSalle: Open Court, 
361–377. 
Davidson, Donald 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
— 1986. A nice derangement of epitaphs. In: LePore, E. (ed.), Truth and Inter-
pretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 433–446. 
Floyd Merrell  126
Derrida, Jacques 1976. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Engel-Tiercelin, Claudine 1992. Vagueness and the unity of C. S. Peirce’s realism. 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 28(1): 51–82. 
Feyerabend, Paul K. 1975. Against Method. London: NLB. 
Gangadean, Ashok. K. 1981. Nagarjuna, Aristotle, and Frege on the nature of 
thought. In: Katz, N. (ed.), Buddhist and Western Philosophy. Atlantic Heights: 
Humanities Press, 202–243. 
Goodman, Nelson 1965. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 
— 1976. Seven strictures on similarity. Problems and Projects. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 437–447. 
Graham, Angus C. 1992. Unreason Within Reason: Essays on the Outskirts of 
Rationality. LaSalle: Open Court. 
Hall, David L.; Ames, Roger T. 2001. Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and 
Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
Havas, Katalin G. 1993. Do we tolerate inconsistencies? Dialectica 47(1): 27–35. 
Heelan, Patrick A. 1970. Quantum and classical logic: Their respective roles. 
Synthese 21: 2–33. 
—  1971. Logic of framework transpositions. International Philosophical Quarterly 
11: 314–334. 
—  1983. Space-Perception and the Philosophy of Science. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Jakobson, Roman 1971. Two aspects of language and two types of aphasic 
disturbances. Selected Writings II. The Hague: Mouton, 239–259. 
Kalupahana, David J. 1986. Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
Kauffman, Louis H. 2001. The mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cybernetics 
and Human Knowing 8(1/2): 79–110. 
—  2002. Laws of form and form dynamics. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 
9(2): 49–63. 
Kothari, Daulat S. 1985. The complementarity principle and Eastern philosophy. 
In: French, A. P.; Kennedy, P. J. (eds.), Niels Bohr: A Centenary Volume. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 325–331. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude 1963. Structural Anthropology. New York: Basic Books. 
Resemblance:  From a complementarity point of view?  127 
Loy, David 1988. Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy. Amherst: 
Humanities Books. 
Mansfield, Victor 1989. Madhyamika Buddhism and quantum mechanics: 
Beginning a dialogue. International Philosophical Quarterly 29(4): 371–391. 
merrell, floyd 1995. Semiosis in the Postmodern Age. West Lafayette: Purdue 
University Press. 
—  1997. Peirce, Signs, and Meaning. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
—  2000. Signs, Science, Self-Subsuming Art(ifacts). Dresden: Thelem. 
—  2002. Learning Living, Living Learning: Signs, Between East and West. Ottawa: 
Legas. 
—  2003. Sensing Corporeally: Toward a Posthuman Understanding. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
—  2005. Cultures, timespace, and the border of borders: Posing as a theory of 
semiosic processes’. Semiotica 154(1/4): 287–353. 
—  2007. Processing Cultural Meaning. Ottawa: Legas. 
—  2009. Sign, mind, time, space: Contradictory complementary coalescence. 
Semiotica 177 (1): 29–116. 
—  2010. Entangling Forms: Within Semiosic Processes. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Murdoch, Dugald 1987. Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Nadin, Mihai 1983. The logic of vagueness and the category of synechism. In: 
Freeman, E. (ed.), The Relevance of Charles Peirce. LaSalle: Monist Library of 
Philosophers, 154–166. 
Nāgārjuna 1967. Fundamentals of the middle way. In: Streng, F. J. (ed.), 
Emptiness: A Study of Religious Meaning. New York: Abingdon Press, 1–25. 
Nesher, Dan 1983. Pragmatic theory of meaning: A note on Peirce’s ‘last’ 
formulation of the pragmatic maxim and its interpretation. Semiotica 44(3/4): 
203–257. 
—  1990. Understanding sign semiosis as cognition and as self-conscious process: 
A reconstruction of some basic conceptions of Peirce’s semiotics. Semiotica 
79(1/2): 1–49. 
Odin, Steve 1996. The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
Plotnitsky, Arkady 1994. Complementarity: Anti-Epistemology after Bohr and 
Derrida. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Priest, Graham 2004. What’s so bad about contradictions? In: Priest, G.; Beall, J. 
C.; Armour-Garb, B. (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 23–38. 
Floyd Merrell  128
Putnam, Hilary 1971. How to think quantum logically. In: Suppes, P. (ed.), Logic 
and Probability in Quantum Mechanics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 47–53. 
—  1983. Vagueness and alternative logic. Erkenntnis 19: 297–314. 
Quine, Willard van Orman 1953. From a Logical Point of View. New York: Harper 
and Row. 
—  1969. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Rosch, Eleanor 1973. Natural categories. Cognitive Psychology 4: 328–350. 
—  1977. Human categorization. In: Warren, N. (ed.), Studies in Cross-Cultural 
Psychology. London: Academic, 3–49. 
—  1983. Prototype classification and logical classification: The two systems. In: 
Scholnick, E. (ed.), New Trends in Conceptual Representation: Challenges to 
Piaget’s Theory. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 73–86. 
Russell, Bertrand 1910. The theory of logical types. In: Whitehead, Alfred North; 
Russell, Bertrand Principia Mathematica I. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 39–68. 
Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Saussure, Ferdinand de 1966. Course in General Linguistics [trans. Baskin, W.] 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Sheridan, Richard 1930. The Rivals. New York: Macmillan. 
Varela, Francisco J.; Thompson, Evan F.; Rosch, Eleanor 1993. The Embodied 
Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge: MIT. 
 
 
Сходство: с комплементарной точки зрения? 
 
Три посылки составляют основу пирсовского базового понятия 
сходства, которое как Первичность едва отличимо от Вторичности и 
Третичности. Вовлечение Первичности во Вторичность и Третич-
ность создает необходимость в небивалентном, нелинеарном, 
чувствительном к контексту образе мышления, который характерен 
для семиозиса — процесса, в котором все всегда превращается в не-
что иное, чем то, во что оно начинало превращаться, — и в то же 
время в качестве одной своей части включает и линеарную, бива-
лентную логику. Некоторые аспекты даосизма, буддистской фило-
софии и «радикальной интерпретации» Дональда Дэвидсона предла-
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гают добавочное и, очевидно, неожиданное дополнение к этим трем 
предпосылкам. 
 
 
Sarnasus: komplementaarsest vaatenurgast? 
 
Kolm eeldust on aluseks Peirce’i baasmõistele sarnasus, mis Esmasusena 
on vaevalt eristatav Teisesusest ja Kolmasusest. Esmasuse kaasamine 
Teisesusse ja Kolmasusse loob vajaduse mittebivalentse, mittelineaarse, 
kontekstitundliku mõtteviisi järele, mis on iseloomulik semioosile — prot-
sessile, mille läbi kõik on alati muutumas millekski muuks kui see, milleks 
see oli muutumas — ja samas hõlmab see ühe osana lineaarset, bivalentset 
klassikalist loogikat. Dao, budistliku filosoofia ja Donald Davidsoni 
‘radikaalse tõlgenduse’ teatud aspektid pakuvad algsele kolmele eeldusele 
lisandust ning küllap ootamatut täiendust. 
 
 
 
